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 4 
Introduction 
At the beginning of my diploma thesis, having studied carefully all its relevant 
sources, I had some brief thoughts created in my mind, in which I would like to be 
mentioned in my introduction, namely how and why there were so many conflicts 
among the states surrounding the Black Sea region and which are concerned 
particularly to Georgia (Abkhazia and South Ossetia), Russia (Chechnya), Moldova 
(Transnistria), Armenia-Azerbaijan (Nagorno-Karabakh) and Ukraine-Russia. So my 
first indicative assumption is that very important role in all these states was playing 
their geostrategic place, their energy sources (oil and gas sources), their transit role 
(pipelines), various financial interests, territorial claims, ports, etc. The result of all 
these was the conflicts’ emergence for different reasons for each side separately, 
which usually had a regional character, whereas some others, had a more serious 
evolution, like in the case of Ukraine, where the Russian engagement - the non-
agreement between Yanukovych and the EU - the Maidan revolt - the annexation of 
Crimea and the USA engagement in a diplomatic sense, resulted in the emergence of 
a civil war in the eastern part of Ukraine and there were fears of a major expansion of 
this conflict so that it becomes a major issue in a global sense. 
A second assumption of mine was that another factor that played a major role 
was that the great powers like the EU, NATO and USA engaged on purpose; first of 
all to protect their interests in various sectors like geopolitics – energy – pipelines -
ports and in other financial and territorial issues, each one of them for its own reasons 
trying to play its own role in the Black Sea region: and secondly, the great powers 
knew very well that the Black Sea region is a quite neuralgic strategic place in the 
global map, which unites Europe and Asia, something known from ancient times as 
far as the significant role it was playing, like in trade with the Silk Road - the colonies 
- commercial ports, the geopolitical issues and later on, the energy sources (oil - 
natural gas - transit pipelines), thus each one of them wanted to be the major player in 
all sectors mentioned above, resulting to the emergence of conflicts for separate 
reasons for each side among these states of the sensitive Black Sea region. So after 
these first brief thoughts of mine, I will go on to the more extensive analysis of the 
various aspects that had a great significance for each of these conflicts separately. 
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Abstract 
The Black Sea region is a dynamic and complex area in which many national 
and international actors have key interests, including Russia and the US. The 
European Union stretches to the sea’s western coast where it meets former Soviet 
territory as well as EU candidate Turkey. Regional tensions include those over NATO 
enlargement, access to the Black Sea, democratization, spheres of interest and the 
conflict zones of Abkhazia, South Ossetia, Chechnya, Nagorno-Karabakh and 
Transnistria. In addition, the region’s close proximity to the Caspian basin offers the 
prospect of alternative energy resources and routes to western states. The Black Sea 
Region is one of the main factors in the make-up of security and stability in Europe 
and Asia. In addition to the numerous other issues in the region, ethnic conflicts, 
ongoing state building processes, the presence of vast natural resources, and strategic 
transport and energy corridors mean that the region is an extremely important and 
sensitive area.  
The Black Sea region has always played a specific role in the foreign policy of 
Ukraine. Security in the Wider Black Sea region is one of the core elements of 
European security, and Ukraine, as one of the major actors in this region, had a 
potential to unite efforts of different states and international organizations to enhance 
cooperation in this region. The Ukraine crisis appears to be a potential turning point in 
Euro-Atlantic security that could be categorized as an active conflict though between 
Russia and Ukraine. Having come as a surprise to many, some senior Western 
officials and politicians have talked of a changed European security landscape, and 
that the crisis both creates new security realities for the twenty first century and 
demands a significant response from NATO. At the same time, however, the crisis is 
the crystallisation of a number of wider and longer-term problems that have been 
increasingly visible for some time, most notably the intensifying sense of strategic 
dissonance between Russia and the West. 
That poses questions. Is regional integration ineffective in dealing with the 
conflicts of identity or separatism? Or is there something special about the conflicts 
themselves or the environment they are developing in? How can these conflicts affect 
the economic, external or defence policy of the countries involved in this battle of 
interests in the area? Concerning NATO and the EU the question is: will joining both 
or either of these organizations helps solve the “frozen” or active conflicts? These are 
some of the research questions that I am going to tackle during this paper. 
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The Abkhazia-Georgia conflict 
 
I will start my analysis with the Abkhazia-Georgia conflict. Abkhazia is a 
Black Sea region which seceded from Georgia after the 1992-1993 war. Its 
geographic range is 8.700 km2, borders Russia and which before the war was an 
autonomous republic of the Soviet Union into Georgia. Its population was 500.000 
people from which 45% are Georgians and 17% are Abkhazians whereas the rest are 
Armenians and Russians. Its currency is the ruble and the official language is the 
Abkhazian. The Russian influence was obvious whereas its laws restricted the 
foreigners and Russians from buying land or buildings, because from the profits of 
these investments especially from Russians, there were fears that they would sponsor 
the opposition parties.  
Regarding its history, it had its own ancient culture which was common with 
the Georgian one, but simultaneously differed. However Georgia, during the 1990 
decade was a country whose political situation was characterized by great corruption, 
authoritarian regime, governmental malfunction, whereas its huge problems were the 
secessionist tendencies of Abkhazia and South Ossetia but the incoming refugees 
from Abkhazia as well. When we refer to the Georgian-Abkhaz conflict we could say 
that it is rooted in the Abkhaz perception of itself as a separate ethnic group with its 
own distinct culture, while ethnic Georgians see Abkhazia as part of Georgia. This 
conflict has been sharpened by human rights violations by both sides during two wars 
and intermittent violence over the last two decades. The conflict has resulted in the 
expulsion of ethnic Georgians from Abkhazia, and ethnic cleansing. The 2008 War 
and Russia’s subsequent recognition of Abkhazia’s independence and security 
guarantee have not resolved the conflict, but only served to make it even more rigid. 
Since the 2008 war, and Russia’s recognition of Abkhazia, the entity has become 
increasingly dependent on Moscow. Half of the entity’s budget comes from Moscow, 
and new Russian military installations are being built in the Black Sea coastal area. 
Almost all Abkhazia residents hold Russian citizenship and almost all the trade is 
with Russia. At the same time, many ethnic Abkhaz are wary of their over-reliance on 
Moscow. The future for the international status of Abkhazia is uncertain. Only four 
countries, including Russia, have recognized its independence. The conflict thus 
remains unresolved and remains a “frozen conflict” with the very real possibility of 
unplanned escalation. Around 212,000 ethnic Georgians remain displaced. While 
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some ethnic Georgians have been able to return to the Gali district, Abkhaz officials 
stated that returns to other parts of the entity would not be authorized. 
The conflict story started during the 1990 decade when the dissolution of the 
Soviet Union started up, Georgia tried to establish itself as a state. After the 
dissolution of the Soviet Union however, secessionist tendencies started emerging in 
Abkhazia (and South Ossetia), with the first one demanding its independence. 
Alongside these events however, Georgia was engaged in a civil war among the 
supporters of Zviad Gamsakurdia and Edward Shevardnadze and in this acute and 
electrified environment, Georgians attempted to get the military control of Abkhazia, 
performing a military operation in 1992. However, after a hard war from both sides 
that lasted until September 1993, Abkhazia, with the support of Caucasian volunteers 
and some Russian troops, took over the whole area. The battle in Abkhazia was 
violent and cost the life of 10.000 people within a year from 1992 to September 1993 
thus there were and many fatalities. After the war, the Georgian troops and a large 
part of the Georgian population were exiled from Abkhazia but there were also ethnic 
cleansing policies against Georgian citizens, especially in the Gali region, from one of 
the hardest groups that was the Islamic unit of Chechnya, which was supported during 
that time by Russia. In 1994, after the UN intervention, there was a ceasefire 
agreement which lasted until 2008. Since then 50.000 Georgians were allowed to 
return to Gali region, which was mainly Georgian, but there are still some small rebel 
units mainly in the Gali area. Also, Georgia and Abkhazia were isolated for years 
from each other thus Abkhazians cannot travel to Georgia or Georgians to Abkhazia 
whereas Abkhazia was showing desolation marks as from the 500.000 Abkhazians 
before the war, there were approximately 200.000 remaining.  
After the Russian-Georgian war though, the independence of Abkhazia is 
declared at 20th August 2009, (from Russia and Nicaragua); as well as in Georgia in 
November 2003 with various demonstrations that were strengthened and then we had 
the “Rose revolution”, leaded by Mikhail Shaakashvili who later on became its 
president in 2004 and who, at the beginning of his presidency, started a process of 
sweeping changes bringing foreign investments, reduced the corruption, introduced a 
better governance system, thus bigger welfare of the population. Later on though, he 
could not control his government, which had a more centralized policy that led to 
weakening of the community of citizens thus developing contradictions between the 
government and the opposition parties. Also, the Georgian government tried to 
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shorten the processes for its accession to NATO in order to bring back Abkhazia (and 
South Ossetia) under Georgian control thus there was a great intensity in its relations 
with Russia, which escalated dangerously and peaked during the war of the August 
2008. 
International efforts to mediate between the two parties to the conflict started 
during the 1992-1993 war and continued thereafter. After all these events, there was 
the first financing of the EU for the peoples that participated in the battles since 1997 
but during the 1990 decade the EU avoided having a substantial role in general for the 
battles emerged in South Caucasus because at first it was far away and second it had a 
low external policy. In this way, it avoided various vital subjects of high policy that 
were related to these battles, but tried to contribute to the peace protection with 
various proposals and regulations for the conflict resolution in Abkhazia (and South 
Ossetia). Peace efforts were aimed at reaching a comprehensive settlement, including 
the political status of Abkhazia, the return of refugees, security issues and economic 
reconstruction. 
However, at 2003-2004 when things started to change the EU started showing 
a greater interest for the region. So in 2006 it signed an Action Plan with Georgia, 
which anticipated cooperation on issues regarding the conflict of Georgia with 
Abkhazia (and South Ossetia). In this plan the EU was facilitated as it was thought to 
be more neutral comparing to USA and Russia which were more politicized on the 
conflict issue. Also, it offered important financing for the restoration of the damages 
from the battles between Georgia and Abkhazia, mainly at Zugdidi region of western 
Georgia and Gali region of Abkhazia whereas in 2004-2005 the financial support 
increased for various tasks, programmes for food supplies for refugees in Abkhazia 
and for the deported who were living in Georgia. So in 2006, EU became the greatest 
sponsor of Abkhazia with programmes of cooperation of decentralized people, which 
were targeted to people outside of the war zone as well. As it seems the EU focused 
on two categories of activities; in the first on the support of citizens, in the second on 
its support to those NGOs that were representing the displaced people into Georgia 
and in others which were promoting the dialogue between the two sides of the battle.  
Furthermore, in these years, the NGOs played a very important role in 
Abkhazia, which was in deep poverty and geographical isolation, with unresolved 
secessionist battles, thus developed their activities and their influence both inside and 
outside Abkhazia, in subjects like the psychological and body restoration of the 
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victims, many regular meetings for disappeared people in cooperation with the NGOs 
of Georgia, the governance, mass media, human freedom, security, confrontation of 
domestic violence, the promotion of sex equality and the freedom of access to 
information. The most reliable and popular NGOs were the Centre for Humanistic 
Programmes, the Women’s Club of Abkhazia, the Sokhumi Media Lab, the 
Entrepreneurs’ Union, etc. 
Furthermore, in the conversations for the issue of Abkhazia and security of the 
area of South Caucasus, with the participation of Georgia, Russia South Ossetia and 
the EU but and the foreign minister of Abkhazia, there was stagnation because 
Georgia refused to sign an agreement on no usage of violence in Abkhazia as it 
considered this region as a possessed place of it and it didn’t want the return of 
Georgian refugees in Gali region and a compensation for their houses. So, all the 
attempts for the battle resolution ended up being unsuccessful. After all these, the 
relations of Russia with Georgia started being in a low level and every few months 
Russia tried to engage giving financial support to Abkhazia and Russian passports to 
its citizens but to bring together military forces in the Abkhazia borders as well, while 
Georgia tried to be reinforced militarily and to be incorporated the quickest in NATO 
with the thought on the return of Abkhazia under Georgian control, to blame Russia 
that it encourages a secessionist action in its area and Abkhazia gradually to be 
isolated fearing a Georgian invasion. All these had as a result the dialogue to be done 
more isolated, the competition to increase and the results to be very limited for the 
restoration of the effects of the battles. However many international factors were 
supporting that it is worth to be pursued by both sides an effort of strong political 
commitment on the highest level, in order not to exist any aggravation of the battle for 
this to end up to a “frozen conflict”. 
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The Georgia-South Ossetia conflict 
 
Another intensive conflict that emerged was in South Ossetia. South Ossetia is 
located within the recognized borders of Georgia and was an autonomous periphery of 
the USSR after the dissolution of which was self-declared as democracy, declaring its 
independence. Its separation though, was not recognized by other countries except 
Russia – Venezuela – Nicaragua as it is thought to be a part of Georgia and which 
does not recognize it as a different entity. According to some estimation, in Ossetia 
there are approximately 20.000 Georgians living at one half of the area and 25.000 
Ossetians at the other half, most of which had Russian passports, Russian nationality 
that had been given to them and which wanted to be part of Russia. 
The present-day conflict between South Ossetia and Georgia is rooted in a 
different understanding of historical facts and developments. Whereas Ossetians 
consider South Ossetia as part of Ossetian territory from ancient times and argue that 
the Ossetians were always closer to Russia than to Georgia, the Georgians hold that 
the ancestors of the Ossetians have migrated from their homeland north of the 
Caucasian mountains. The tensions in this area between South Ossetia and Georgia 
started at approximately the 1920 decade, when the first one made some unsuccessful 
efforts to gain its independence but the only thing it achieved was to become an 
autonomous region of Georgia into the USSR. A disagreement about the status of 
South Ossetia within the Soviet federal system was the starting point for the violent 
conflict between South Ossetia and Georgia, which evolved in parallel with the 
dissolution of the Soviet Union. In 1989 South Ossetia together with North Ossetia 
pressed to be incorporated in Russia or gain its independence, but this action caused 
in 1990 the battle as the former Georgian president Gamsakurdia didn’t accept it thus 
in 1991 there were hostilities among them, so 2.000-4.000 people died and many 
others were displaced. 
In June 1992, with the Russian mediation we had a ceasefire and the 
establishment of peace units in a security zone around the Ossetian capital Tchinkvali 
which were made up of 1100 soldiers from which 530 were Russians and 300 from 
North Ossetia, whereas at the end of 2003 Michail Shaakashvili took the power during 
the “Rose revolution” and became president in 2004. Shaakasvili immediately after he 
took over he promised to apply democratic and economic reforms and also he grew 
pressure on South Ossetia about stricter controls along its borders for the 
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confrontation of smuggling which had by its side the Russian organized crime and 
corrupted Georgian dignitaries as cooperators. Also, he sent military police and secret 
agencies’ officers and approximately 500 soldiers which were the allowed limit 
according to the ceasefire agreement, with the excuse to preserve the peace.  
In July 2005, president Shaakashvili announced a new peace plan for South 
Ossetia in which he was giving important autonomy and which had three stages like 
the demilitarization, the economic restoration and the political adjustment. However, 
the South Ossetian president Kokoiti denied the plan, claiming that the South Ossetia 
citizens are also Russian citizens. In mid-2005, Kokoiti on his turn deposited a peace 
proposal that anticipated the key points, but with the presupposition that South 
Ossetia will be independent, but in November 2006 a referendum took place in South 
Ossetia for its independence, in which, as autonomists mentioned, 95% of the 55.000 
subscribed citizens approved of the independence, although State Department refused 
to recognize this voting. In March 2007 president Shaakashvili suggested another 
peace plan for South Ossetia, which anticipated the creation of transitive 
administrative districts all over the area and the creation of a committee that would 
exercise the South Ossetian regime as part of Georgia. The meeting that took place in 
Tbilisi for this issue in October 2007 produced no outcome and no further meetings 
were arranged. 
In July 2008, Russia performed a military exercise with the code name 
“Caucasus” in which 8.000 soldiers participated and took place near the Russian-
Georgian borders. However, at the same time with the Russian exercise, almost 1000 
USA soldiers and 600 soldiers from Georgia, Armenia, Azerbaijan and Ukraine 
performed an exercise with the code name “Immediate Response” 2008. The scenario 
that was spreading for this Russian exercise was that hypothetically, there was an 
attack that took place in the secessionist regions of Abkhazia and South Ossetia and 
that the Russian troops counter-attacked through the air, sea and land in order to 
protect the “peacekeepers” that occupied these areas, but the Russian citizens as well. 
The Georgian foreign ministry though was protesting that this exercise was a threat 
for invasion and after a few weeks proved to be indeed a rehearsal from the Russian 
troops for that reason. After all these tensions that started from 1920, we are at 2008 
for a violent battle between Russia-Georgia, with the independence of Abkhazia and 
South Ossetia regions as a stalking horse, but substantially Russia wanted to protect 
its geopolitical interests. 
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So the tensions started to escalate with various excuses like in 3 July 2008 
with the death of the police leader and the head of the pro-Georgian government of 
South Ossetia Dmitriy Sanakoyev, who avoided a mine injury, thus artillery attacks 
started in villages from both sides. In 8 July 2008 four Russian militant planes flew 
over the aviation area of South Ossetia, with the excuse to discourage Georgia from 
attacking South Ossetia, thus Georgia recalled its ambassador to Russia for 
“consultations”. After the air invasion, the USA foreign minister Condoleezza Rice 
arrives at Georgia in order to find ways of defusing the situation and Russia to respect 
the independence of Georgia and stressed the strong USA commitment for the 
territorial integrity of Georgia. 
In the evening of 7 August 2008, South Ossetia and Georgia accused each 
other that there were artillery attacks, from the one hand Georgia in Tchinkvali 
whereas Ossetia in Georgian villages. At the same night Shaakashvili declared the 
one-sided ceasefire and called South Ossetia to do the same, but S. Ossetia continued 
bombing the Georgian villages, thus compelling Georgia to send land troops to 
Ossetia and declare the end of the ceasefire. The Georgian troops were soon in control 
of a large part of Ossetia and Tchinkvali city, thus the Russian president Dmitri 
Medvedev called an urgent meeting of the Russian Security Council in 8 August to 
arraign the Georgian invasion in Ossetia, supporting that there are children, women 
and elderly people being killed, most of which are Russian and those who are 
responsible for this will be punished. So in 11th August he declared that Russia is the 
permanent guarantor for the Caucasian security and never a passive observer. 
Onwards, in response to the Georgian invasion to South Ossetia, Russia 
unleashed air attacks in the area, sending troops with experienced professionals. In 
Ossetia, the same day, the Russian militant planes destroyed Georgian airports and 
airbases near the Georgian capital Tbilisi, whereas thousands of Russian soldiers 
recaptured Tchinkvali and the biggest part of Ossetia arriving to the borders with the 
rest of Georgia. The Russian ships debarked troops in Abkhazia and took places in the 
open of the sea of Georgia. Shaakashvili, declared the country in war situation, 
activating all the reservists as well whereas at the 10th of August the foreign minister 
of Georgia announced at the Russian foreign minister Sergey Lavrov that all Georgian 
troops withdrew from South Ossetia and asked for a ceasefire, but Lavrov claimed 
that Georgian troops remain in Tchinkvali and with this excuse, at the 11th August 
Russia bombarded Gori city and claimed it.  
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After this war, the existing effects harmed both countries. In the case of 
Georgia and Ossetia the battles had as a result the death of hundreds of soldiers and 
many civilians, the scale of damages to be very long and to exist thousands of 
displaced, destroyed Georgian villages and houses that emanated from civil protectors 
of South Ossetia in an effort of them for ethnic cleansing. Also, the military 
infrastructure of Georgia was deconstructed at least temporarily, in such an extent to 
need huge military support from USA and NATO in order to retrieve them, whereas 
the railway transportations with Azerbaijan were temporarily interrupted towards the 
Black Sea ports and some oil and gas pipeline delegations, although there were no 
damages reported from the battles. Concerning Ossetia, the military operations cost 
hundreds of thousands of dollars, with Russia to declare and commit for the 
restoration of its area. In the Russian case however, after its disproportionate battle 
with Georgia, the one-sided recognition of the independence of South Ossetia, its 
refusal to negotiate directly with Shaakasvili, the interception of diplomatic relations, 
trade, transportations, the demand of Russia to Georgia in order to abandon its efforts 
to be incorporated to NATO, as well as lustrate Shaakasvili from president, all these 
harmed its image as a reliable and peaceful member of the international community. 
In general though, this war, according to the report of the World Bank had as a 
consequence the shrinkage of liquidity in the bank system, in public finances, huge 
damages in material infrastructure and huge problems for the displaced people. The 
damages occurred were estimated at $394.000.000 which had to be restored 
immediately, whereas the financial development for 2008 declined from 9% to 3% 
and according to the bank report, the low paces of financial development will endure 
for several years. 
So in the 13th August, former USA president Bush confirmed that 
Condoleezza Rice will visit France and Georgia and together with the defense 
minister Robert Gates, will announce a multiannual plan for humanistic help as relief 
for Georgia. In the 30th September 2008, Congress members visited Georgia, the 
independence and territorial integrity of Georgia is signed and an additional help is 
given for its restoration of about $365.000.000. In the 12th August noon, the Russian 
government declared that Medvedev called Javier Solana who was the supreme 
ambassador of EU for the common foreign policy and security in order to announce to 
him the end of hostilities, the restoration of civilian population with the assent of 
Georgia for peace, which he wanted to sign as well. In contrast to all these, in the 
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meeting he had with his generals, he ordered them to continue the purging with 
bombings from the militant planes in all over Georgia, for the detriment of military 
bases, bridges, industries and other strategic points. 
Later on, in the 12th August, he met up with the French president Sharkozy, 
who was acting as the EU president and had the role for an agreement between Russia 
and Georgia. The French president showed a peace plan for ceasefire from the EU 
part in which in many points the Russian president agreed and so the French foreign 
minister flew to Tbilisi in the evening 12-13 August to show the plan to the Georgian 
government. Medvedev and Shaakasvili talked in the evening and initially they agreed 
in a six-point plan. Later in his interview Sharkozy announced a peace plan that calls 
all the members of the battle to stop the hostilities, to withdraw all the troops back to 
the positions they had conceived before the battle, it addressed an appeal for 
humanistic help and the return of the displaced people, excluded any report for the 
Georgian integrity, the withdrawal of Russian troops from Georgia but it let Russian 
“peacekeepers” to stay and patrol in a security zone outside South Ossetia which will 
include a strip of Georgian territory alongside its borders. Russian peacekeepers were 
allowed to take additional security measures. Furthermore, it was agreed to launch 
international discussions on security and stability arrangements for Abkhazia and 
South Ossetia. 
The plan also involved opening of international talks for the security and 
stability of South Ossetia and Abkhazia and a greater international role in peace talks 
for the preservation of peace. In the 13th August, an urgent meeting of the foreign 
ministers of the EU approved of the possible participation of EU observers; in the 14th 
August Medvedev accepted the presidents of Abkhazia and South Ossetia in Moscow 
and signed the peace agreement, in the 15th August the French foreign minister visited 
Tbilisi and Shaakasvili signed the agreement thus in 8th September Sharkozy 
negotiated an agreement, that 200 EU observers will develop in the battles zone and 
almost all the Russian troops will be withdrawn from the border areas of Abkhazia 
and South Ossetia till the midnight of 10th October. 
The reactions naturally that existed were many by leaders and organizations of 
the world, who rushed to mediate in this conflict between Georgia and South Ossetia, 
whereas many of them thought that the responsibility for this battle was shared in both 
sides but the main issue was the ceasefire and humanistic help. So these governments 
criticized Russia for the excessive violence and the recognition of Abkhazia and 
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South Ossetia against to the territorial integrity of Georgia, but Georgia as well for the 
recovery of South Ossetia with violence, while for the European leaders there should 
be immediate compliance with the regulations of the peace plan. Also, we had 
statements from many leaders like Angela Merkel who characterized the recognition 
as unaccepted and that the conversation still could open with the use of international 
mechanisms for the conflict resolution; Sharkozy with the quality of the EU president 
who condemned the recognition as contrary to the principles of independence of 
dominance and of territorial integrity of Georgia and that EU will examine the effects 
for Russia; and the Italian foreign minister Franco Fratini, who warned for a western 
reaction of isolation of Russia.  
Also, this recognition was widely condemned from the United States and the 
international community, but also many observers warned Russia that it was in danger 
because of its behavior, with international isolation from all states and elimination of 
its membership in the global trade organization of G8. However, certain concerns 
were expressed by the former Soviet Union states like Ukraine, as if Russia 
encourages the secession of its eastern part and of the Crimean peninsula. Also, 
Azerbaijan appeared to be hesitant about the problem of secession of the Nagorno-
Karabakh region, if it should be solved with violence, whereas Armenia by its side, 
because of its good relations and strong ties with Russia, was concerned if the latter 
was to intervene in its security. Finally, Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan, although they 
refused the diplomatic recognition of Abkhazia and South Ossetia, approved very 
quickly of the humanistic help to these areas. So, after all these events, in the 17th 
September 2008 Russia signed an agreement of Friendship, Cooperation and mutual 
help with South Ossetia and Abkhazia, which anticipated that their peripheries would 
decide for the number of troops accommodated, would let Russia establish military 
bases and develop army along the borders to help their defense if necessary, their 
citizens would enter Russia and its embassies freely when traveling abroad, whereas 
they will pledge that their policies on tax issues, social welfare issues, pension bank 
laws, energy, transportation, communication issues, all these would keep up with the 
Russian systems. After all these, in February 2009, the Russian headquarters 
announced the construction and restoration of the facilities of Tchinkvali in South 
Ossetia and Gali of Abkhazia and the delegation of 3700 soldiers in each area, as well 
as that some ships from the Black Sea fleet will remain in Abkhazia port.  
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The divisions between the parties on matters of principle are enormous. The 
United States, the EU and Georgia have a clear understanding of where Georgia’s 
borders are and a clear conviction that Abkhazia and South Ossetia lie within them. 
The conflict in the Caucasus has also created divisions in the EU over how to deal 
with Russia—a key energy supplier to the EU. Some EU member states, led by 
France and Germany, have pushed for a diplomatic solution to the situation in 
Georgia. Others, including Poland, Italy, Sweden and the UK, have advocated a 
stronger stance against Russia. They see Russia’s military presence there as a 
violation of the principle of host-nation consent and thus illegal. Russia, Abkhazia and 
South Ossetia have a different read on Georgia’s borders, with all three calling the 
latter sovereign states, which permit the Russian military to operate there on a 
consensual basis. Regardless of the merits of either view, one thing is for certain: 
After two years of holding firm, neither side is likely to change its stance anytime 
soon. But after discussing the issue in both Moscow and Tbilisi and visiting areas 
affected by the conflict in recent days, we believe that the parties can and should 
move ahead on important steps on humanitarian and security matters despite these 
differences. 
The crisis over South Ossetia between Georgia and Russia that took place in 
August 2008 highlights the volatility of the Black Sea region as a new flashpoint in 
the common neighbourhood between Russia and the European Union. What has made 
the conflict in Georgia so crucial to the EU is the fact that this is not to be seen as an 
isolated occurrence. The incidence has repercussions throughout a region that is 
marked by a framework of challenges to political stability and democratic 
consolidation – factors that directly affect European security and welfare. Abkhazia 
and South Ossetia intensified their calls for the recognition of their independence by 
Russia, the United Nations and other international organisations following Kosovo’s 
recognition of independence.  
The consequences of the conflict in South Ossetia are not only debated in 
international law, but also in international politics, above all as the reactions to the 
hostilities. The recent conflict in the Caucasus has strained Russia’s relations with 
some Western countries. NATO–Russia relations, which have in the past achieved 
cooperation on significant issues, such as Afghanistan and counter-terrorism, have 
also been affected. Russia’s prospective membership of the WTO is also now in 
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doubt. The Russia–Georgia military confrontation has had a significant impact on 
Georgia’s political and strategic outlook and that of the immediate region. It has 
contributed to the increase of Russia’s influence in Abkhazia and South Ossetia. 
Long-term impacts of the conflict are still to be assessed. The assumption exerted 
from many observers was that the agreement created a complete dependence of these 
Georgian regions from Russia thus it is unknown at the moment what will happen in 
the future, in this battle and so to be considered temporarily as a “frozen conflict”.  
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The Russia-Chechnya conflict 
 
Another conflict that emerged was in Chechnya region. The so-called republic 
of Chechnya is located in the North Caucasus and borders in the north with Russia 
and south with Georgia and Azerbaijan and the citizens of Chechnya are 
approximately 1.000.000. Chechnya took its name from the name of a lowland 
village, where Russians as well met them for the first time. Its area however, was 
called from the tsarist period as Chechnya. Its territory is squared and lies between the 
rivers Terek and Suza at the west and north, at the eastward is expanded to the Andi 
Mountains that separate it from Dagestan and in the south to Caucasus. Its land is 
covered with dense forests and is crossed by many currents that spring from the 
mountains of the south. Chechens were living in their region for at least 6.000 years 
and their language belongs to a Nakh subcategory that stems from Caucasian 
languages. Russians though call Chechnya the western part of the region because the 
southwestern part was occupied by Ingush people.  
It is mentioned that during the Stalinist era (1924-1953) Chechens were exiled 
along with other minority groups in Siberia and Central Asia, whereas in 1950 the 
Soviets let them go back to their country, which they had been missing for decades, as 
well as their land and the financial resources and for that reason Chechens were 
pursuing their independence. So, when we had in 1991 the dissolution of the USSR, 
there were secessionist battles in North Caucasus thus the secessionist tendency of 
Chechnya was gaining ground to contribute to the dissolution of the former 
Democracy of Chechnya-Ingushetia. Then Boris Yeltsin who was president of Russia 
put pressure for the application of a federal system that would allow the autonomy in 
governance and taxes and most Caucasian democracies accepted it, whereas 
Chechnya was the first one that demanded its independence, thus in December 1994 
the Russian troops invaded in the autonomist democracy of Chechnya. During the 
period 1994-1996, Russia fought against the Chechen autonomists and two years of 
harsh battles followed in a bloody campaign that had thousands Russian and Chechen 
casualties and hundreds of thousands displaced people. All these happened until 
August 1996, when Aslan Mashadov, the Chechen rebels’ leader and Russian general 
Alexander Lebed negotiated an agreement for ceasefire and the withdrawal of Russian 
troops. This agreement remained, and the decision concerning the constitutional 
regime that imposed until 2001, whereas in the next winter Mashadov became 
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president of the autonomist government by winning the elections and after six months 
of his presidency, along with Boris Yeltsin signed an official peace treaty for the end 
of the Russian attacks in Chechnya. That’s how they ended the first war, leaving open 
though the issue of Chechnya independence but Russia as well agreed to comply with 
the international law. Chechen independence fighters faced one of the largest and 
best-equipped military forces in the world. They chose to use urban guerilla tactics 
against Russia’s tanks and automatic weapons. Though after only six months of 
fighting, Russia occupied all the large towns in Chechnya, Chechen fighters used the 
time to regroup, and then fought their occupiers from within. When Russia gained the 
upper hand, Chechen’s captured hostages in Russian cities and forced Russia to 
negotiate with OSCE supervision. 
Furthermore, the organized crime and the Islamic extremism increased in 
Chechnya and other borderland places of Russia but existed and bombing actions in 
cities like the bomb attack in Moscow blocks from Chechen terrorists, which had as a 
consequence, the resurgence of the battle in August 1999. So, Prime Minister Putin in 
15 September 1999 ordered to military and police forces to enter again Chechnya at 
the end of 1999 whereas at the beginning of 2000 the Russian troops claimed the 
larger part of the area and there were huge numbers of losses to civilians and 
displaced citizens.  
However, the most notable battle, which evolved in this war and was called 
fairly as the hardest one, was the Grozny siege by Russian troops. So, it is mentioned 
that in 4 December 1999 Russians compassed Grozny and after they warned the 
remaining citizens throwing leaflets from the sky to abandon it, started the attack with 
the Thunder Task force in which the soldiers were trained in new tactics and 
techniques of military operations, supported by a combination of various weapons like 
artillery air force and missiles SS-21 Scarab type. Furthermore, they began the 
destruction of most buildings in order to decrease the coverage of the warriors who 
used them as a defense. Also, many free marksmen participated in this battle from 
both sides, which had the mission mainly to control basic junctions and it was said 
that it was a free marksmen’ war. While the battle was evolving from house to house 
and Chechens were losing ground, suddenly it seemed that they found ways for their 
replenishment and being reinforced with new warriors, thus at the beginning of 
January to counterattack and win back their territories. 
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Suddenly though, at that moment Puslam Gebayev (known as Black Angel), 
withdrew the force of his 1500 men without any order, leaving the rest of Chechen 
forces. So in the beginning of February, because of the increasing losses and the 
decreasing supplies, the instruction given was to evacuate Grozny, during a 
snowstorm – big fire - with constant ambushes and through minefields. However, 
Russians at the beginning had not realized that Chechens were evacuating Grozny and 
thought it was a trick; then, when they realized their mistake they tried to destroy the 
various routes to the villages of Chechnya, so that the Chechen warriors cannot escape 
to Chechnya so what followed was a big massacre with the number of victims to be 
detrimental. 
Despite all these that happened, their heavy losses, the bad weather conditions, 
the minefields and the Russian attempts to exterminate them, the Chechen warriors 
managed to escape through the canyons in the countryside where they interspersed 
and started creating rebel groups against Russians. So, Grozny was declared by the 
nations as the most destroyed city in the world, as well as the 4th February as one of 
the best documented violations of human rights by the Russians. It is mentioned 
though that the reasons for the nasty events evolved in Chechnya were many. The 
main one though was the mid-period of the wars (interwar) during which there was a 
fragile state power, the institutions that were dissolute and replaced by criminal ones, 
the armed criminality, the snatch of enterprises but mainly the competition of the war 
leaders for power, who were interested for the war economy, namely for the illegal 
profits and who, when threatened by the establishment of a polity and a control 
system, managed without difficulties to resort in violence. Furthermore, other factors 
that played a primary role were the vast oil resources, the pipelines passing through 
the Chechnya territory, its strategic position in Caucasus and the fear of its secession 
that would constitute a precedent for other republics as well to secede. In the 3rd 
March 2000 though, Russia declared the end of the 2nd war, whereas the first had 
taken place in 1994-1996. 
The effects of the war in Chechnya were huge for both sides in human losses 
mainly of civilians, many displaced people, destructions and damages in the 
infrastructure, and there were committed many ferocities by both sides as well. Russia 
suffered heavily from the war, not only in terms of the number of soldiers' coffins. 
The war encouraged and revivified all the forces opposed to Russia's brief flirtation 
with liberal democracy. There was a return to heavy-handed media censorship and the 
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persecution of supposedly unpatriotic elements worsened. The power of the military 
and security apparatus grew. Russia emerged a less democratic country. Meanwhile, it 
has become clear that Russia's victory had a pyrrhic character, and that while 
Chechnya was bound and gagged for a while, its desire for revenge has remained. 
Russian army focused more on the civilian population, committing mass murders, 
tortures, beatings in the popular “filtration camps”, arbitrary arrests and interments, 
tortures and systematic rapes. Also, there were flagrant infringements of the 
humanistic law in the “filtration camps” which were located in rough establishments 
where women and kids suffered systematically from rape, were beaten, tortured 
violently with electric shock and tear gas, but and the indiscreet bombings and bomb 
attacks and the three big scale civilian massacres confirmed through interviews of 500 
witnesses, as well, in Alkhan-Yurt village the Russians killed 17 citizens, plundered 
and burned houses and raped women; whereas in Grozny area Russians murdered 50 
civilians; in Aldi area of Grozny Russians shot 60 citizens that waited for the soldiers 
to check their documents and in 24 October 1999 a Russian air attack in the Martin 
district hit a humanistic convoy. 
However, on the other side as well, that of Chechens, there were also various 
crimes committed, like the fact that Chechen warriors were using civilians as human 
shields, executing compendiously Russian soldiers against the international 
humanistic law. But we should not forget that Russia has many victims from the 
2002-2004 period by the worst terrorist attacks ever happened in the world and have 
been committed from Chechens so that Russia to become the terrorism centre of the 
world, whereas the bomb attacks of 2010 in the Moscow metro remind to West, that 
Russians suffered from the terrorist attacks of the Chechen rebels and it is mentioned 
that they were acting in the whole area and were having connections with Muslim 
extremist organizations. 
Considering how the Chechnya conflict has changed over the last ten years, it 
now requires international attention. Unfortunately, too many agendas have been 
projected on to the Chechnya conflict by a variety of outsiders including Western 
commentators, most of which are of little interest to the Chechen or Russian 
populations. These include the agendas of the global jihad and western 
interests. Although the Russian government insists that the Chechnya conflict is a 
front of the international war on terror, it has persistently refused any international 
involvement. Continuous human rights violations in Chechnya demand worldwide 
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attention, especially since Russia is a signatory to various human rights treaties 
pertaining to the OSCE and the Council of Europe. Besides, Russia has failed to solve 
the conflict on its own and the current corruption of the Russian Federal Security 
forces is creating further instability in the region. Russia has failed to constructively 
engage the local populations to promote stability in the region. The international 
community should work with Russia on addressing its huge security problem in 
Chechnya, while giving the Chechen people a rightful place on the agenda of the 
European Community. 
Concerning the reactions that existed from the West for this war between 
Russia-Chechnya, these were contradictory - without indication of any determination 
– with some European countries remaining silent, whereas the unique specific 
measure that existed was in 2000 by the European council, which showed its 
contradiction for the Russian actions in Chechnya, so it suspended the voting right of 
the Russian representatives. In 25th March 2001 the European council restored the 
voting right of Russia when Putin announced a decline in troops and approved of a 
new structure for the governmental policy of Chechnya, thus substantially there were 
no binding decrees for the issue of human rights in Russia by the West and it avoided 
asking for accountability for all these events that happened during this war and Russia 
to claim that the battle is over. However, there have been few serious efforts at peace 
negotiations throughout the conflict. During the first phase, Russian and Chechen 
delegations met on a few occasions. In the second phase of the conflict, Russia 
refused to recognize President Maskhadov’s authority and therefore all efforts at 
peace negotiations at official and unofficial levels have been ineffective. As of now, 
Russia maintains a certain control over the Chechnya territory while rebels continue 
to be active.  
Politicians and analysts are divided between those who consider economic 
interests to be the principal source of the conflict and others who see a geostrategic 
U.S. plan to gain influence in the region. Both explanations indicate that the tragedy is 
far from over. Just the opposite: If the major powers do not change and the charade 
continues, the conflict is only certain to get worse. The war shows no sign of ending 
soon and international factors are stating that the violence is ready to erupt again as a 
“frozen conflict”.  
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The Moldova-Transnistria conflict 
 
Another conflict that emerged was between Moldova and Transnistria. 
Transnistria is a secessionist democracy which consists of a narrow land strip of 4.163 
km2 between the eastern banks of river Dniester of Moldova and the city of Bender 
with the surrounding areas that are located westwards and Ukraine in the east. 
Transnistria is occupied by 500.000 people from whom 59% are Russians – 
Ukrainians and Slavs and by Moldavians – Romanians who constitute 32% of them. 
Its capital is Tiraspol, a city with 203.000 citizens, which by the three quarters is 
Russian and Ukrainian. Transnistria though is plagued by corruption – organized 
crime – smuggling and it has been accused of weapon sales and money laundering, 
while its president is the Ukrainian nationalist Yevgeny Shevchuk who won the 
elections in December 2011. 
Transnistria is an autonomous geopolitical unit which declared its 
independence in 1990 and which supports its right on the land of Bender’s city and 
the surrounding regions in the western bank and the area at the eastern of Dniester. 
Today it maintains its independence, thanks to the military support from Russian 
army, which is located there from 1950 when the whole region was part of the USSR, 
but it grants to it financial support as well.  
Officially, the Moldavian authorities recognize it as an autonomous unit with 
special regime, but consider almost the whole of its territory as part of the Democracy 
of Moldavia. Moldavia though, has a vibrant history. It is about a Romanian-speaking 
place known historically as Bessarabia, which after the First World War was claimed 
by the Soviets in 1940 and was reconstructed as Moldavian Soviet Socialistic 
Democracy, but Moscow added the Russian-speaking area of Dniester which was a 
former autonomous part of Ukraine, adding to it future ethnic problems. So in the end 
of 1980, when Soviet Union was dissolute, Moldavia faced an identity problem 
because its citizens came from different ethnic origins. Also, nationalism in Moldova 
was increasing and a new law in 1989 declared the Moldavian language as official 
one and made it obligatory for all citizens to speak the two languages but there was a 
huge reaction from the Russian-speaking and the Ukrainian-speaking as they 
considered it as discrimination. 
Transnistria has been linked to Russia since the treaty of Jassy, signed in 1792 
when Moldova was still part of the Ottoman Empire. From 1945 to 1991, the 
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Dneister’s east bank was part of the Moldavian Soviet Socialist Republic, one of the 
15 republics of the USSR. In June 1990, as the Soviet Union was breaking up, the 
Slavonic language-speaking population revolted against the Moldovan parliament’s 
adoption of a law making Romanian the sole official language. In February 2014 the 
new government of Ukraine, formed after the Maidan protests in Kiev, made the same 
mistake by proposing to abolish Russian as a regional official language, a move seen 
as provocation in the east of the country. In both Moldova and Ukraine, these laws 
have played a key role in the escalation of political conflicts between ethnically 
heterogeneous regions, leading to civil war.  
After all these, Transnistria decided on its secession from the Moldavian SSR 
in September 1990. A year later, when the Soviet Union fell apart, the Moldavian 
SSR declared its independence as well as Transnistria. However, after World War 
Two because Transnistria had a heavy industry and despite it had only 17% of the 
population of the old Soviet democracy, it contributed in 40% of the GDP. So, the 
new independent state of Moldova with the 3.6 million citizens who were very poor, 
tried to regain Transnistria thus a brief war emerged between March and July 1992. In 
29 March 1992, after the event that the paramilitary officers of Transnistria during the 
previous months had taken control of the left bank, Moldova declared emergency and 
in 2 April the battle erupted with serious battles, which were mounted in May and 
June 1992 and which stopped after the Bender battle in 19-21 June, when the former 
soviet army which continued to have a strong military body of 1200 soldiers in 
Transnistria, interfered and leaded the Moldavian army out of the Bender city setting 
up the end of the battle.  
The results of this battle were the loss of 1000 warriors from both sides, 
51.000 domestically displaced people and 80.000 refugees who resorted in Ukraine, 
as well as the internationalization of this conflict because of the Russian participation 
on the side of autonomists. After the ceasefire, a tripartite mixed control committee 
was created, which consisted of Russia, Moldova and Transnistria in order to 
supervise the demilitarized security zone in both banks of river Dniester. But 
Moldova and Transnistria started negotiations and we had the meeting of the 
Moldovan Prime Minister Iurie Leanca and Shevchuk, with Moldova to announce that 
its parliament will examine the obviation of the travel limitations for the Transnistrian 
citizens who had Russian or Ukrainian passports. In September 2006 the Transnistrian 
citizens voted with overpowering majority for their independence and created their 
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own regiment, flag, national anthem and coat of arms, but and military, police, postal 
system and currency. 
Later on, Moldova as well signed a free trade agreement and a treaty of 
political connection with EU which offered 3.5 million for the citizens of this poor 
country as well as to travel without visa in the group of the 28 nations. Russia though 
showed its dissatisfaction on this action through an indirect threat that it could stop 
the gas supply to Moldova, while the foreign minister of the United States visited 
Moldova announcing that the Obama government would support trade cooperation 
between Moldova and the United States. 
However, during the first half of the year 2013, because of their territorial 
differences, the tensions raised again, as in 10 June, Transnistria president Shevchuk 
published a decree concerning the border security. This document anticipated that in 
the next months the PMD area will expand in Varnita city and in many villages 
controlled by the Moldovan government and the Transnistrian army will undertake 
their control, as well as this decree anticipated the creation of a service that will be 
responsible for the border protection. The consequence to all these was the tensions to 
increase during the night of 26-27 April in the security zone in Moldovan borders, 
thus the president of Moldovan Democracy Niculae Timofti to express his great 
concern which at this point was justifiable and to criticize in an intense style this 
action but also to consider it as a territorial threat for the unity in his country. But the 
Russian diplomat Sergey Gudarev observed that «it’s better to have ten years of 
negotiations than a day of war». His words leaded to the hope that these tensions will 
not escalate in a war. 
The role of the EU in this conflict, after the configuration of its European 
policy in 2003-2004 and the signature of the Action Plan EU-Moldova in 2006, 
became more active on the issue of Moldova including Transnistria for the resolution 
of the in-between them conflict. This new EU policy and its mediation attempts 
resulted to its increasing engagement in the conflict issue between Moldova and 
Transnistria. The major part of the EU engagement in the conflict resolution in 
Transnistria operated through official communication channels in the form of direct 
conversations between EU and Moldovan authorities, but there were also informal 
contacts of the EU officers and with the Transnistrian leadership. However, EU set 
the issue of the Transnistrian conflict in conversations it made with Russia and 
Ukraine, as both were important factors for the conflict resolution but and to various 
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summit meetings. Also, EU was and an observer in the 5+2 talks (OSCE, USA, EU, 
Ukraine, Russia, Moldova, Transnistria) for the conflict resolution where EU, OSCE, 
Russia and Ukraine were the mediators and USA the observers but these talks were 
postponed in February 2006, while other negotiations for the border conflict in 
Transnistria took place in Vienna in 2011 and in Odessa in 2013. Moldova has not 
given up its sovereignty over Transnistria, making the conflict solving a critical issue 
in its efforts to move closer to the European Union. On the other hand, Transnistria 
wants to move closer to Russia, which has raised concerns in Moldova and abroad 
after the Russian annexation of the Crimean Peninsula – and after Russia has voiced 
its own concern of Moldova’s strengthening ties with Western Europe. 
Moldova has significant economical reasons for approaching EU. The 
Association Agreement between EU and Moldova goes significantly further than 
classical forms of economic integration, offering not only improved trade and 
investment opportunities but also assistance in trade-related reforms with the aim to 
contribute to economic recovery and growth and to better integration of the Moldovan 
economy with the world markets. Moldova will benefit from new trading 
opportunities and easier access to the EU market. The Agreement will allow the 
Moldovan economy to catch up with the EU in terms of competitiveness and thereby 
gradually find its place in the world economy. This will open up new opportunities 
not only in EU-Moldova trade, but in Moldova’s trade with the rest of the world, 
given the worldwide recognition of EU norms and standards. The most sensitive 
sectors will benefit from long transitional periods to ensure the smooth adaptation of 
Moldova’s economy. The issue of Transnistrian independence can thus puts a spanner 
in the works of Moldova’s movement towards the European Union. The presence of 
Russian troops in Transnistria does not make the situation any simpler. Later on, EU 
appeared as a mild power, giving sufficient motives through the Action Plan EU-
Moldova, which had to do with the encouragement for democratization, the freedom 
of the visa regime, the local trans-border traffic, the student exchanges, the trade and 
the Transnistrian citizens to can easily apply for passport in Moldova in order to travel 
or study more easily in the EU but and the Transnistrian growers to export their 
products in the EU market with the same favorable terms of Moldova. In these ways 
the EU tried from the one hand to relieve poverty in Moldova to be able to be 
incorporated in the EU and on the other hand it would make Moldova more attractive 
to people and enterprises in Transnistria, that even their politicians not search for 
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another solution to change the conflict regime. In the end, the EU stated that it is 
ready to support a financial package suggested by Moldova in 2006 for trust 
construction and would consist of a total of works between the right and left bank for 
both sides, which would contribute to the amelioration of people’s life in Transnistria 
region. But the first installment would be directed to works of the community of 
citizens like health, environment and education, which would take place in 
Transnistria.  
The purpose though, of all these works was the reinforcement of the regime in 
brief time and the amelioration of the status of the relationships between them. Also, 
especially in the Moldovan side many NGOs were activated in the field of battle 
resolution, with special programmes on this issue. In many cases, they were calling 
the Moldovan and Transnistrian authorities for works that would contribute to the 
creation of bridges or networks among the community of citizens in both banks of 
river Nistru, in order to build ties on issues that were influencing both sides at the 
same degree. Other NGOs in Transnistria tried to confront various issues like poverty, 
human rights but also educational and social policies which occurred from the 
situation created by the conflict. The result of all these was that the democratization 
would be possibly a gradual process. So, the opinion of many analysts of the 
international community and other experts on policy construction for the conflict of 
Moldova with Transnistria, was that this secessionist battle was one of the several 
ones that go on in the former Soviet Union but it was the easiest, the briefest and least 
violent in the whole USSR, as well as it was not nationalistic as no nationalistic group 
pivoted against each other, there was no ethnic cleansing but it was more of 
geopolitical nature and is connected to the dissolution of the Soviet Union.  
Furthermore, other reasons were that the organizations of the international 
community were late to engage and failed to offer any alternative solution for the 
conflict, thus the autonomists to use the lack of progress for the resolution of the 
battles, for the consolidation of the status quo in the area with state characteristics and 
distinctive national identity because they supported the legitimacy of their request for 
independence and which would be based on a distinctive regional identity of 
Transnistria with tight ties with the USSR. Another reason was that the consolidation 
of the autonomists with the support of Russia during the period and after the battle 
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obligated Moldova to believe that only Russia could bring this issue on the 
negotiations table. However it was opposed to the independence of Transnistria 
because it was supporting in these negotiations that it would be better to create a state 
inside Moldova, whose regime to remain permanently neutral. While OSCE who was 
the main responsible for the peace, on 16 years had proven that it was insufficient for 
the arrangement of this conflict in the area. However, there was agreement from all its 
members for the continuation of its mediation and appeal to the EU for a more active 
engagement of it in these negotiations. So, after all these years of negotiations the 
conflict remains unsolved and more specifically a “frozen conflict”. 
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The Nagorno-Karabakh conflict 
 
Another notable conflict was in the Nagorno-Karabakh region between 
Armenia and Azerbaijan. Nagorno-Karabakh is a region located in Caucasus, its range 
is 4.388 km2 and has a population of 188.000 citizens, from which 158.000 are 
Armenians and in the 1991 census they constituted 85% of its indigenous population 
while its capital is Stepanakert. Despite the fact that its population declined with the 
years passing by, Nagorno-Karabakh continues to maintain its Armenian homogeneity 
in a high level. Nagorno-Karabakh has a long history and as it is proved by many 
historical documents, archaeological and architectural monuments that relate to 
Armenian history, witness that Nagorno-Karabakh was part of Armenia for many 
thousand years.  
The name Nagorno-Karabakh (often called simply Karabakh) is a relatively 
recent combination of the Russian word Nagorno, meaning mountainous, and the 
Turkic-Persian word Karabakh, meaning black garden. The de-facto authorities of 
Nagorno Karabakh as well as most Armenian sources use the historical name of the 
region: Artsakh, meaning strong forest. The origin of both names seems to be linked 
to geographical features: elevation, cooler climate and, in ancient times, forests rich in 
game and fruit. Azeri sources report that the term "Nagorny Karabakh" is a Russian 
translation of the original name in Azerbaijani language - "Dagliq Qarabag" 
(pronounced as "Daghlygh Garabagh"), which literally means mountainous Garabagh. 
The conflict concerning the Nagorno-Karabakh region is really a conflict 
between two principles: territorial integrity and self-determination. On the one hand, 
the borders of Azerbaijan were internationally recognised at the time of the country 
being recognised as independent state in 1991. The territory of Azerbaijan included 
the Nagorno-Karabakh region. On the other hand, the Armenian population of 
Nagorno-Karabakh (the majority even before "ethnic cleansing" in 1992-1994) claim 
the right of self-determination. They are supported by Armenia. Armenians from 
Armenia participated in the armed fighting over the Nagorno-Karabakh region besides 
local Armenians from within Azerbaijan. Today, Armenia has soldiers stationed in the 
Nagorno-Karabakh region and the surrounding districts, people in the region have 
passports of Armenia, and the Armenian government transfers large budgetary 
resources to this area. However, in our times many leaders of Azerbaijan were afraid 
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of making this historical analysis, as in this way they would undermine their own 
positions.  
Azerbaijan is a country that is located to the eastern Transcaucasia, its capital 
is Baku; its range is 86.600 km2, including Nagorno-Karabakh and Nachichevan, its 
population is approximately 7.000.000 citizens, from which 90% are ethnic Azeris. Its 
Language is the Azeri one, regarding its religion, 93% of the citizens are Muslim Siis 
and Sunnis and the rest in majority are Armenians with their own religion (Armenian 
Christian church), while it is rich in mineral wealth. Finally Armenia is the smallest 
and southernmost Eurasian country, which borders Turkey in the west, Georgia in the 
north, Azerbaijan in the east and Iran in the south. Its capital is Yerevan, its range is 
228.900 km2 and its population is approximately 3.5 million people, with the 68% of 
its population to be urban. The extremely though high percentage of religious and 
linguistic ties has consequently configured a strong ethnic identity. Its presence in 
Transcaucasia dates back to 6th century BC and had a unique alphabet that belonged 
to the Indo-European language. The Armenians are culturally different and as far as 
ethnicity and culture is concerned; they do not resemble anything with their Azeri 
neighbors. 
The story of Nagorno-Karabakh starts from the old times before at least 3.000 
years of regular presence, during which various events took place, coming up to the 
more recent ones, with their constant evolution. So we come up to 1918, when 
Azerbaijan declared its independence in May 1918 and Nagorno-Karabakh as an 
integral part of its territory, a decision that was denied by Karabakh Armenians. Since 
then, after its incorporation, it never abandoned its reunification target with Armenia, 
which was imprinted in the national memory of its citizens, as this reunification, after 
the end of the foreign domination, would fulfill the presuppositions, so that the 
historic Armenian lands to unify and improve the needs of the whole population for a 
material welfare. 
However, in 1918-1920 the common offensive of Turkey and Azerbaijan in 
Nagorno-Karabakh, led to a destruction and the departure of at least half a million 
Armenians, thus the Armenian people to not forget this ethnic cleansing, even though 
the general assembly of the United Nations adopted the treaty of its Genocide and 
exercised prosecution for these crimes in 1948. Azerbaijan of course, has not signed 
the current convention until today, however the well-documented Armenian genocide 
would be enough by itself to support the cause of Nagorno-Karabakh to become an 
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independent state. But in 7 July 1923 Azerbaijan officially declared the incorporation 
of Nagorno-Karabakh which got the name “autonomous district” liable to Azerbaijan.  
After this event, Azerbaijan started applying an anti-Armenian policy in 
Karabakh, which was proved from crushing facts. So, many concerns started about 
forced migrations, for reduction of the Armenian population with corresponding 
increase of Azeris, for lack of financial development, and till 1930, 118 Armenian 
churches to be closed, clergymen to be arrested, school books of Armenian history to 
be banned in schools, 28 Armenian schools in 1960 period to close, churches and 
cemeteries to be destroyed whereas in 1970 decade, Azeris were appointed in the law 
and finance body of the organizations. So, this political and cultural mistreatment in 
Nagorno-Karabakh from Azerbaijan, through the decades, as well as the unequal 
share of economic resources, the demographic manipulations, the infringements in 
regional administration, the breach of cultural ties with Georgia and the threats for the 
body security of Armenians, was the reason to deepen the rivalry among Armenians 
and Azeris, so that ethnotic groups were created. The result was Nagorno-Karabakh to 
be in a disadvantageous position in relation to demographic characteristics, because 
many historical foundations that existed for high level learning lost their glamour 
because of sovietization and the area becomes rural with a soviet educational system. 
Instead, Azerbaijan was an urban and industrialized democracy with many 
educational foundations. The assumption though that extracted was that if the 
confrontation of its population from Azerbaijan was not that hard and the population 
of Nagorno-Karabakh was more satisfied as persons but as ethnicity as well and its 
region had some autonomy as well as absence of political, financial and cultural 
limitations, possibly the Armenian irredentism could decline a lot. Despite though the 
fact that the Nagorno-Karabakh population during these years declined, it continued 
having an Armenian composition and a high level of homogeneity.  
So, the political, social and cultural mistreatment and oppression from Azeris 
and the future threats, re-confirmed the national aim of Nagorno-Karabakh Armenians 
for an independent state. After all these in Nagorno-Karabakh a nationwide 
referendum took place for the state independence in 10 December 1991 where 98% of 
its population voted for it. However, the situation changed drastically in 23 December 
and it was the key point that escalated the militarized crisis and the war. So the 
regional council of Nagorno-Karabakh set its right to defend national aims and stop 
the Azeri offensive and declared its independence in 6 January 1992.  
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A little bit later, the Armenian dignitaries of the regional council of Nagorno-
Karabakh started to be replaced from Azeri ones, but in the 31st of January, Armenia 
announced that it has no territorial claims and a policy of deference was followed by 
Nagorno-Karabakh in 11 February 1992 and made a peace proposal to Azerbaijan that 
it was ready to negotiate, however a sudden strategy change of Nagorno-Karabakh 
occurred in February 1992 when Armenian forces started a strong offensive against 
Azeris both in the external Nagorno-Karabakh and also inside Azerbaijan. So in 
between February and May 1992 the Armenian forces attacked Azerbaijani cities and 
in the domestic Nagorno-Karabakh and claimed the Lachin city of strategic 
importance in order to create an open corridor between Nagorno-Karabakh and 
Armenia, but in Azeri positions in Nachichevan as well, thus in May 1992 the 
Armenians to have the total control of Karabakh, while the population of the 
Azerbaijani area stayed either voluntarily or by force; but the speed with which a 
large territorial range of it was lost, caused great political unrest and political 
instability in Azerbaijan. So, in 13 June 1992 Azerbaijan started a counterattack to 
reclaim the territories lost in Nagorno-Karabakh. However, Armenian threats as well 
stroke the political status of Nagorno-Karabakh; consequently, under this pressure, its 
government resigned in 15 August, while another Azerbaijani attack started in 18 
September, which was fronted by Nagorno-Karabakh in 6 February 1993. Despite the 
many appeals for ceasefire to stop this bloodshed, the war continued until spring 
1994. The losses in this war were the death of 30.000 people, the creation of 
approximately 1.000.000 refugees and the cause of many material damages.  
After all these very nasty events, the agreement for ceasefire was signed from 
the three generals in 27 July 1994, who were then the Armenian defense minister 
Serge Sarkisian, his Azerbaijani corresponding Mamedrafi Mamedov and the army 
commander of Nagorno-Karabakh Samvel Babayan and for the first time the battling 
sides signed for immediate postwar truce, on the direction of a constant peace and 
international security. The three generals expressed their will to intensify their 
attempts for the signature of a political agreement during the 30 days of August 1994 
which would arrange military and technical issues including peace forces and OSCE 
observers. This of course never happened, because both sides had as a main purpose 
the ceasefire signature to stop the fight, as from that point onwards their aims were 
different. From the Armenian side this fact was important, namely the ceasefire, for 
the reason that it would create a more stable environment in this region so that 
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Armenia to consolidate its new conquests to security zones around Nagorno-Karabakh 
and Yerevan but expressed its special satisfaction as well for the Moscow attempts, 
which sent forces for the maintenance of peace in the region, Azeris though from their 
point of view desired to maintain the ceasefire line as a pressure point against 
Armenians, but they didn’t want peace forces from Russia with the ceasefire line 
many times to be violated with various minor incidents and there were victims like in 
2009 which had reached 19, whereas in Azerbaijan the dominating thought was that at 
some time will pursue to overrule this regime with the use of heavy equipment.  
So an intense military competition was created between Azerbaijan and 
Armenia, mainly from the side of Azerbaijan because of its vast incomes from oil and 
gas supplies; consequently its defense budget to be in 2009 approximately $1.4 
billion, three times bigger of Armenia’s which was $400 million. Azerbaijan was 
fueled by Russia with missiles S-300 to strengthen its defense and to protect its 
energy infrastructure which would be targeted by Armenia if Azeris tried to get 
Nagorno-Karabakh by violence whereas its army consisted of 67.000 soldiers. The 
army though of Armenia had 47.000 soldiers; and what is not estimated is the 
Nagorno-Karabakh army which was approximately 20.000 soldiers.  
However, the Armenian forces were considered more trained for a prolonged 
fight, while as experts were saying Azerbaijan did not have the ability to predominate 
in the battle arena. Also Armenia on its side had got important amounts of Russian 
weapons in low prices but the ceasefire line and the mounds on its mountainous 
territories were a natural defense, where the Armenian forces have built many 
fortifications from the side of their line. 
Furthermore, many diplomatic attempts were made for the battle resolution of 
Nagorno-Karabakh like the attempts of Washington which for many years tried to 
solve this issue through the Minsk Group, the organization for security and 
cooperation in Europe, in which the USA, Russia and France co-preside and which 
discussed a political solution that anticipated the withdrawal of Armenia from the 
seven regions around Nagorno-Karabakh, return of the displaced Azeris in these 
regions and gradually into Nagorno-Karabakh itself, development of an international 
peace force for the prevention of new violence and a referendum for the regime of 
Nagorno-Karabakh with a future date. Also, another attempt made for this conflict 
which took place by Medvedev in six tripartite meetings with the presidents of 
Armenia and Azerbaijan since November 2008. All these attempts though didn’t have 
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much success. This was debt on the one hand to the Armenian side, which was 
uncompromising in relation to the maintenance of Nagorno-Karabakh control and the 
seven regions of Azerbaijan but to every territorial compromise of huge importance as 
well; on the other hand Azerbaijan though on its side which did not trust the 
international community that would apply the decrees and its law commitments and 
so it pivoted to increase its military power to press Armenia to abandon the occupied 
territories. For all these that happened, many special negotiators and the Minsk 
leaders as well accused the Armenia and Azerbaijan presidents of not preparing their 
people for peace thus to end up to failure of an agreement. 
Nevertheless, the most notable absence from the peace process for Nagorno-
Karabakh was that of EU, which was only interested in disposing more resources and 
expertise and contributing significantly to the attempt of stability and restoration of 
Nagorno-Karabakh region, as it did in Balkans. Also, the EU tried to secure a more 
active role in the area through its special representative in South Caucasus Peter 
Semerby for the peace in it, but the Minsk group claimed that EU had posed its role to 
France despite that it has undertaken a different duty of high diplomacy, thus EU 
didn’t manage to undertake a useful duty in this conflict until today. 
So, the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict, even if it has been in the centre of 
international attention from 1988 and there had been many international diplomatic 
attempts for many years concerning the conflict resolution of Nagorno-Karabakh, all 
these attempts for the attainment of a viable solution have failed until now, 
disappointing the heads of the mediators. The two basic impediments that were 
existing in between them, according to the opinion of many analysts for the effective 
resolution of the conflict of Nagorno-Karabakh, are on the one hand the denial of 
Azerbaijan leadership to participate in direct talks with Karabakh, as possibly such a 
commitment would mean the independence recognition of Karabakh; while on the 
other hand from the Nagorno-Karabakh side the argument is that there are no 
warranties for its security from the international community which is a significant 
issue for Karabakh, thus justifiably its leaders were cautious, fearing that a wrong 
move in a dashing decision-making framework would bring a new era of concession 
of its territories. 
However, there were other reasons as well which make it difficult to solve this 
conflict; like that the battle of Nagorno-Karabakh was remaining in low priority for 
the international community, with the thought that there was no direct war danger, so 
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there was no significant pressure on the local leaders to obligate them to be receptive 
in some peace plan. Also, the co-presidents of Minsk Group in a diplomatic level 
were trying to bridge the differences in the difficult issues with two suspicious leaders 
who were denying almost all the proposals with the other side thus the process to be 
prolonged for acceptance of a peace agreement. Despite though the good work that 
the Minsk Group did and had success in several cases, in contrast only six observers 
existed to notice the Line of contact that separates the Armenian and Azeri forces, a 
fact that means that the ceasefire is maintained with the two sides showing their good 
will. 
Furthermore, another reason was that the organizations of the United Nations, 
the World Bank and other developmental services, had a silent agreement among 
them that this battle was not of high priority for huge international resources to be 
disposed for the restoration of these areas. In these regions though the needs were 
very huge, like in the seven peripheries of Nagorno-Karabakh which are controlled 
partially from Armenia and were completely destroyed with the entire basic 
infrastructure and its region was full of mines, while it would need many years of 
work before they are suitable for habitation in order for the refugees to return. So 
there was a hope that these organizations with their experience and skills would 
accomplish these works and if they are asked, to contribute to the signature of a 
political agreement, because in an opposite case their non-participation in these 
attempts will have as a result the negotiations to be transferred in the next years. For 
that reason a restoration programme should start to be planned by all services. 
So, probably the real reasons should be searched, that might not be in sectors 
of ideology or social and ethnic psychology, but in the geostrategic sector. The result 
though of all these was that Armenians followed the tactic of a regularized status quo 
and a de facto situation in this region, whereas Azeris tried to support with global 
statements from their various lobbies their own territorial integrity but the formation 
as well of their military forces as an indirect threat of them that they have the right to 
recapture their territories. 
So the conflict of Nagorno-Karabakh is not an inactive conflict as regularly 
several soldiers are killed in incidents on the Line of Contact. However, there could 
be negotiations between the two presidents of Armenia - Azerbaijan for a successful 
peace strategy of long duration, which could include the recognition of the Nagorno-
Karabakh Republic with international law features of the international law. So the 
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final assumption which is excluded from all these facts, is that the unresolved battle of 
Nagorno-Karabakh continues to be in the long term a certain issue of the wider area, 
between Azerbaijan and Armenia, that makes it temporarily a “frozen conflict”. 
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The Ukraine-Russia conflict 2014 
 
Another conflict that can be characterized as the biggest one is that of 
Ukraine-Russia, with the major part of the world attention to be turned to it. So 
Ukraine is a country of Eastern Europe which borders Russia in the east and 
northeast, Belarus in northwest, Poland, Slovakia and Hungary in the west, Romania 
and Moldova in southwest whereas it is doused from the Black Sea and the Azov Sea 
in the south and southeast correspondingly. Its range is 603.628 km2 so to be the 
second biggest country of Europe after Russia. Its capital is Kyiv, its official language 
is the Ukrainian and its currency is grivna. In regards to the energy part, Ukraine 
plays a decisive role for Russia because in the one hand it is the first consumer of 
Russia with 60% of its imports in natural gas and on the other hand it is an energy 
transit state because of the pipelines that pass through its territory for the 80% of the 
Caucasian natural gas that is exported from Russia to western Europe. 
Historically, Ukraine was founded in the 9th century by the Rus’ of Kiev and it 
existed as the first strong eastern Slavic state that was dissolved in the 12th century, 
but in the middle of the 14th century the Ukrainian territories were found under the 
Golden Horde domination, the big dukedom of Lithuania and the kingdom of Poland. 
After the great north war (1700-1721) Ukraine was divided and its major part was 
incorporated in the Russian empire and the rest to the control of Austria-Hungary. 
Afterwards though of a long period of attempts to become independent after the First 
World War (1917-1921) and the Russian civil war in 30 December 1922 it becomes a 
democracy of the Soviet Socialistic Democracy and expanded westwards a little 
before the Second World War and southwards in 1954 transferring Crimea in the 
Ukrainian territory while in 1945 it becomes one of the founding members of the 
United Nations.  
However, in 1991 with the dissolution of the Soviet Union, it became 
independent again, while during this period its economy passed eight years of huge 
recession, and in the first years of the 2000 decade its economy recovers and increases 
its GDP significantly but again its economy sunk after the 2008 crisis with its GDP 
declining 20% from 2008 to 2009 and in the process to recover again. So, the country 
of Ukraine was for many centuries in partial or total domination by Moscow, whereas 
in its population, one in three people is a Russian nationalist and speaks the Russian 
language and two out of three the Ukrainian, but a major part as well of the briefing is 
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in Russian. Also, another issue is the bisectional mentality that occurs among the 
people of Ukraine is that many citizens of the western part of Ukraine see Russia 
suspiciously and to want to be incorporated in the EU and become European citizens 
and so to exist many protests, thus in every elective confrontation this part to vote 
candidates with European policy. While in the eastern side of Ukraine the citizens 
vote politicians who were friendly to Russia as it was in the case of Yanukovych, that 
his origin was from the eastern of Ukraine and to want their unification with Russia.  
So in 2004 after the massive demonstrations that were made well-known as 
“Orange Revolution” Yanukovych won the presidential elections but there were huge 
protests because there was fraud in them and he couldn’t take over his duties but in 
2010 he wins the elections which seemed to be legal. So, in November 2013, 
president Yanukovych refused to sign the treaty of connection with the European 
Union and in 21 November 2013 started the demonstrations for the agreement with 
Europe in the Independence Square of Kiev with the name Maidan, for that is called 
“Euromaidan” as well. The first reason for the demonstrations was that president 
Yanukovych denied the agreement with the European Union, getting a rescue package 
from Russia of $15 billion, whereas many Ukrainians believed that the agreement 
with the European Union would help the problematic economy of Ukraine and 
because they wanted tighter ties with the European Union in cultural and political 
issues. The second reason for the demonstrations was that Yanukovych had a 
government unable to handle the economy, with big corruption, authoritarian, that had 
taken harsh measures for the repression of the demonstrations but and was a dummy 
of Russia. So the denial of this agreement was the reason that the demonstrations 
expanded so quickly with the request to resign from power the president.  
In the months that followed, Yanukovych wanting to curb these 
demonstrations, sent the domestic security forces, the dreadful “Berkut”, announced a 
series of laws for the limitation of basic rights of Ukrainians for free speech and 
gatherings; these laws though worsened more the protests thus they expanded and in 
other cities as well. After the 16 January 2014 these events became more violent, the 
anti-governmental demonstrators proceeded in captures of governmental buildings in 
Kiev while during the riots from the 18 to 20 February 98 people were killed and 
thousands were injured. In 21 February Yanukovych signs an agreement with the 
opposition party under the pressure of the events for the termination of violence and 
declared early elections for December, with the demonstrators to want his resignation. 
 39 
In 22 February the Ukrainian parliament declares Yanukovych fallen and announces 
presidential elections for the 25 May 2014, whereas Yanukovych escaped to Russia 
asking for asylum. For that reason, many Ukrainians were happy whereas the 
Russian-speaking in the eastern side of Ukraine and in Crimea considered it illegal 
and anti-democratic. So the power is taken over by a temporary government which 
consisted of the center-right party of Batvakina and its leader, the far-right Svoboda, 
independent deputies and other parliamentary coalitions, but from many 
commentators there were various comments for the far-right Svoboda. 
So with this rapid evolution of events, in 1 March Putin asks for and gets the 
approval of the Russian parliament for delegation of Russian troops specifically for 
the Crimean peninsula while in the next days the soldiers of the Russian army, with 
the order to not wear insignia of Russia so that it is not accused, very quickly control 
the greatest part of Crimea. In 16 March 2014, the parliament of Crimea declares a 
referendum for the autonomy of the region and its unification with Russia. The 
referendum was for the unification with Russia with a very big percentage around 
96% which of course later on was validated, while the transitive government of 
Ukraine characterized the Russian actions as a war reason and declared mobilization. 
 Furthermore, the United States and the European Union imposed financial 
sanctions to Russia as a punishment for this issue, but there was no indication of 
Crimea return in Ukraine. After this event, many Russian provinces in the eastern part 
of Ukraine were asking as well for their independence and unification with Russia 
whereas in May 2014 Petro Poroshenko was elected as president who took over his 
duties in June. The reason why Putin made this quick move in Crimea was that its 
region is of vital importance for Russia as it secures its outlet in the Black Sea and its 
ports for the Russian fleet. The significance of the Crimean peninsula for Russia was 
that its region historically for 200 years was under the Russian domination but it is 
granted by Nikita Khrushchev in 1954 to the Ukrainian Soviet Socialistic Democracy 
and in 1991 in the referendum of Ukraine for its independence after the dissolution of 
the Soviet Union, Crimea remains part of Ukraine with important autonomy, its own 
laws and its own president, as well as the majority of its population is Russian. 
Geographically, it is located in the northern side of the Black Sea which is 
surrounding it and territorially is located in the south of Ukraine in a significant 
geostrategic place.  On its territory it has huge military bases and in its marine place 
its important port was Sevastopol where the Russian fleet was located, the issue of 
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which was solved during the summit meeting of Sochi in 1994, when Ukraine sold the 
major part of its fleet in Russia and in return Russia donated it the debts it had from 
the natural gas provision. However in 1996 Ukraine, based on its regiment of 1996 
lapses the parking of Russian troops and Russia threatened to increase the price of 
natural gas. So in May 2007 Russia hired the port for 20 years in return to the 10-year 
postponement of the payment of the debts of Ukraine from the natural gas and later on 
made a renewal of the port hiring in September 2010 for 30 years in return for the 
reduction of gas price by 30%. So for all these issues (geostrategic – important ports), 
which were of vital importance for Russia, it seemed that Putin substantially wanted 
to take Crimea back again. As always, there is no consensus about what will happen 
next. The population in Crimea is mixed, with Tatars (Turkic ethnic groups), 
Ukrainians, and Russians all living together. It is unclear how Russia is going to 
handle Crimea, given the shifting demographics. 
So after all these events that happened – Yanukovych governance - revolts in 
Maidan - annexation of Crimea, had as a result in winter of April 2014 various battles 
to start to outburst of low intense at the beginning between the Ukrainian army and 
the autonomist rebels mainly from the Russian-speaking of the eastern Ukraine, who 
occupied some cities like Slaviansk and Donetsk in the eastern area which was known 
as Donbass. These started escalating in the east with the excuse that circulated that the 
citizens of the eastern region lacked their elective right from the Ukrainian authorities. 
One of the most important leaders was Igor Cirkin who was a Russian citizen and 
military veteran who had withdrawn from the internal security services of Russia just 
a few weeks before he takes over to lead the rebels and it is believed that he included 
Russian Special Forces without insignia in order to show them as rebels, whereas 
thousands of Russians had crowded near the borders. Ukraine though for many 
months had not moved menacingly against the rebels fearing if maybe is accused for 
any deaths thus to be accused from Russia that it violates the protection of the 
Russian-speaking of eastern Ukraine. Substantially namely, none of the two wanted to 
show up in order to be able to negotiate a peace agreement at the given moment. 
The things though changed to worse when the Ukrainian government at the 
beginning of July, ordered to start an attack to push back the rebels once and forever 
and to recapture its various territories. So, at the beginning of August, the rebels 
started to lose ground thus Russia to start equipping them with weapons of high 
technology and ground-air missiles for their support whereas Ukraine intensified its 
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attack thus in the middle of August Russia to escalate its support to the rebels and in 
an obvious way the Russian military forces to invade. However Ukraine started to 
protest that in 16 August it caught Russian tanks and that in 21 August the rebels’ 
leader got reinforcement of 1200 soldiers from Russia. Since then though after these 
events an undeclared war escalated between Russia and Ukraine, despite the ceasefire 
was agreed in 5 September 2014.  
After all these that happened, the attempts started in a diplomatic level, in 
which a decisive role was played by the U.S. and the European Union which wanted 
the punishment of Putin for the annexation of Crimea and the invasion of the eastern 
Ukraine. So they started imposing gradually various and very difficult financial 
sanctions which were targeting Putin, his internal political cycle but and the huge 
Russian economy which was on the verge of recession. By continuing the sanctions 
the European Union which although is in a large degree dependent from the exports of 
Russian natural gas and it would harm its economy and despite the cautious behavior 
of the German chancellor Angela Merkel, supported some of them. 
The current conflict in Ukraine has spawned the most serious crisis between 
Russia and the West since the end of the Cold War. It has undermined European 
security, raised questions about NATO’s future, and put an end to one of the most 
ambitious projects of U.S. foreign policy—building a partnership with Russia. It also 
threatens to undermine U.S. diplomatic efforts on issues ranging from terrorism to 
nuclear proliferation and in the absence of direct negotiations; each side is betting that 
political and economic pressure will force the other to blink first. Caught in this 
dangerous game of chicken, the West cannot afford to lose sight of the importance of 
stable relations with Russia. 
Onwards, the United States and the European Union isolated diplomatically 
Russia from the group of eight (G8) which is an annual conference of the biggest 
industries and democratic states of the world but NATO as well suspended every 
cooperation with the Russian leadership. However, the United States and the 
European Union avoided some military reaction fearing some further escalation of the 
events because Russia has one of the biggest armies and nuclear in the world, but and 
did not have any mutual defense treaty with Ukraine, whereas the EU and USA 
declared their commitment for the defense of the borders of other eastern countries. 
With these sanctions, the EU and USA wanted to prevent Russia from a further 
invasion and to achieve its deference and withdrawal from Crimea, but on this issue 
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was not shown any deference from the side of Russia. However, the United States and 
the European Union avoided some military reaction fearing some further escalation of 
the events because Russia has one of the biggest armies and nuclear power in the 
world, whereas the United States and the European Union do not have any mutual 
defense treaty with Ukraine but they showed some commitment as well for the 
defense of the borders of other eastern countries with which they wanted to prevent 
Russia from a further invasion and to achieve its deference and withdrawal form 
Crimea something that in this subject had not been sighted.  
However, in these sanctions Russia reacted immediately with the infliction of 
various measures in the sectors of energy, defense and mainly in the money-credit 
sector declaring the inhibition of imports of fruits and vegetables from the European 
Union, the United States, Australia, Canada, Norway, etc. as well as the imports of 
apples from Poland, but and with the announcement of various dignitaries and the 
prime minister Medvedev that these measures are under examination, as well for the 
industrial sector (cars and the airplane production). However, all these limitations that 
are imposed are in a very bigger scale than the sanctions that were imposed from the 
United States and the European Union because Russia is the largest foreign market for 
the sales of fruits and vegetables from the European Union and the second larger for 
the American poultry. The effects though that will exist from these ambivalent 
sanctions in these countries will be serious for the interests of each side. 
So, from the side of Russia the short-term effects could cause the increased 
prices of the products striking many Russian consumers and the group that possibly 
would have problem from this inhibition would be the middle-class consumers as well 
as the Russian population to blame the West for these shortages and the increased 
prices that were caused by the banning of fruits and vegetables, thus Russia to 
decrease the import of foreign foods and return to a more self-contained policy similar 
to that of the Soviet Union during the era of the Cold War, but simultaneously to 
create a geopolitical competition with the West. 
On the other side, these evolutions would have a decisive meaning for the tight 
cooperation of the United States and the European Union, because it would make the 
cooperation more difficult due to the different interests between them on the issue of 
Russia. Because Europe depends much more on the Russian energy than the United 
States but and a large part of its external trade made it with Russia but and its 
European members, mainly Germany and Italy were more hesitant for the infliction of 
 43 
sanctions in Russia, despite these Germany and Italy agreed on a third round of 
sanctions in the sectors of energy, defense while in the money-credit sector it was 
only in the case of the Malaysian plane demolition. However, from the side of the 
United States the problem would be smaller because with the exception of its poultry, 
it exports very little agricultural products and foods in Russia and this is 
approximately the 11% of its exports to it. 
The situation however was different because the big losers would be the 
European Union members like the eastern Europe Poland and Lithuania which would 
be affected as well as Germany and Netherlands together with Spain and Italy, but not 
so much as the eastern countries. Furthermore, after the Minsk agreement in 5 
September 2014 for the ceasefire, the manipulation of the relations with Moscow was 
a difficult challenge, because Putin, having the huge support of the people and with 
his popularity reaching 85% in August, it seemed that he was not in a mood to abide 
by this agreement, starting to press on various levels like in military – financial – 
political. So in a military level he continued to send secretly heavy equipment in the 
Russian-Ukrainian borders as well as 200 to 300 soldiers of the Special Forces for the 
support and training of the rebels in the areas of Donetsk and Luansk that remained 
outside of the Kiev’s control.  
Furthermore, in a financial level, he pressed Ukraine in June 2014 with the 
interruption of natural gas supplies due to its debts thus in winter to freeze the 
apartments in its blocks, leaving the issue open for more drastic measures if no 
solution is found on their problem. So Ukraine is obliged to sign a new agreement in 
October 2014, under the term that it will pay the $5.3 billion for its unpaid debt till the 
end of December 2014 with money that it has been borrowed from the International 
Monetary Fund. In a political level though, he escalated his nationalistic rhetoric in 
the public mass media that the government of Ukraine is a Nazi regime which with 
the support of the United States threatens the world as it had done previously in a 
security conference in Munich when it had stated that he was directly opposed to the 
Washington policy which tries for its own interests to set up its own autocracy. After 
all these, it seems that this agreement is fragile with the danger to collapse while the 
policy of Putin is aiming with these pressures to a viable energy policy, probably 
though and he wants to transform the eastern Ukraine and its secessionist areas in a 
“frozen conflict”. 
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The Russian invasion of February 2014 was seen as a cruel act by many 
people around the world. But for the people in Ukraine, this invasion was nothing but 
a call for the war and some people termed this cruel invasion as the act of salvation 
for the Russians. With every passing day, the feeling of hatred is growing and there is 
no mutual admiration left between the people of two countries. The Black Sea region 
today stands with a set of challenges for Ukraine and its foreign policy – challenges of 
lost opportunities and increased competition. Ukrainian foreign policy in the Black 
Sea region will not be successful until the Black Sea region is seen as a complex and 
interconnected system rather than a set of bilateral relations. It is time for Ukraine to 
elaborate an independent security policy in the Black Sea region, taking into account 
new tendencies and its own national interests. The most acute phase of the eighteen-
month-old Ukraine war is over, at least for now. But nothing is settled yet. 
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My personal thoughts 
Let’s be honest. The framework of conflicts in the entire area of the Black Sea 
and beyond, is a characteristic one of the situation that evolved since Antiquity. It is 
true that from the ancient years until today, the interest for the natural sources of the 
area was astonishing and the will for domination was unstoppable. The process of 
colonization indicates the will and hope of people from around the world, the 
merchants, warriors and navigators to find out natural wealth in order to exploit it for 
their own or their countries’ good. Russia from medieval times onwards ad USA from 
the 19th century onwards have been engaged in an ongoing battle of interests in this 
area, attempting to impose their power and get to exploit the natural wealth of the 
area. These superpowers are constantly trying to accumulate power, equip armies, 
create propaganda against each other and develop a feeling of domination against the 
entire world system, but in recent years the areas of Black Sea and Middle East are of 
most importance for them, especially on the energy and natural wealth sectors. Great 
powers since Antiquity have been attempting to dominate over weaker states of these 
areas in order to get what they want and make profits, so Russia and USA could not 
constitute exceptions. It is a common secret that since their stabilization among the 
most powerful countries of the world they are trying to make an exhibition of power 
to every other country in the world and make it clear that they do not want 
competitors. The European Union is somewhere in the middle in this story and has 
mainly the role of the passive observer, who can be active in certain cases if there is a 
threat against security or interests of the weaker European countries. The truth is that 
EU does not want to take the main role player in this story of battles, as it knows that 
it does not have the equipment the armies and the infrastructure that is strong enough 
to compete or confront these great powers. In addition Russia especially, which is the 
most interested country as it is closer than any other to the Black Sea region and is 
actually a part of it, tries to clarify that it will not tolerate actions or sanctions that will 
harm or threaten its interests in the area and this is the basic disagreement between 
Russia and USA-EU. Russia is playing a hard poker game in the area, letting the other 
surrounding countries to fight against each other, using their battles as coverage for its 
real intentions. So subsequently, only if there is a kind of compromise or peaceful 
coexistence in this area, should we have a feeling of stability there, it can reassure that 
we are going to have a kind of stability and security in the entire area. Everything is 
fluid and temporary and a matter of time as well. 
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Conclusion 
At the end of my diploma thesis and after my analysis for the conflicts of the 
states and the engagement of the current super-powers in the wider region of the 
Black Sea, I ended up to some assumptions in which I would like to be mentioned 
briefly for each one separately. The first though assumption that is exerted is that the 
wider area of the Black Sea owes a neuralgic geostrategic point on the global map 
with rich energy sources (oil - natural gas - pipelines) which unites Europe with Asia. 
Concerning the conflicts of the states that existed in the area, others were erupting for 
territorial claims, whereas others mainly for energy issues, thus due to the geostrategic 
position of the region and its energy resources, to engage and the current super-
powers for their own interests each of them.  
Furthermore, the second assumption is that to all these conflicts main role 
played on the one hand the reasons I mentioned previously and on the other hand the 
governments they had, which were corrupted – authoritarian with complex policy 
whereas their political leaders were incompetent to govern in order to pursue their 
peoples that peace wants compromises as well. Also, various political analysts blamed 
them that probably wanted to dodge from the Russian orbit and be incorporated in the 
European Union and become European citizens; for that and they were continuing the 
secessionist tendencies.  
A third assumption is that each one of the super=powers was following its 
own policy in this area. So the USA wanted to isolate Russia in various sectors like 
the economy, the geostrategy, the energy and the politics, in order to impose their 
autocracy. In men financial sector they tried to strike the Russian economy and its 
internal political cycle but and helped Ukraine, giving her financial loan through the 
IMF. To the diplomatic sector they tried to isolate her from G8 (world trade council), 
whereas on the military sector to cut her away from every cooperation with NATO. 
However on the politics sector, they offered openly their support to the eastern 
countries (Georgia – Baltic – Ukraine) for the battles that were happening to the 
eastern Ukraine but and the annexation of Crimea. 
From its side though, the European Union followed a milder policy in most 
sanctions because of its financial recession, its weak policy, its dependence on the 
energy sector from Russia but as well because the largest part of its exports in 
agricultural products was directed to Russia, while it avoided the military intensities 
because Russia is a powerful military power. As a consequence of all these was 
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Russia to react immediately, with the blockade in imports in agricultural – livestock 
products from the European Union and the United States – invaded the eastern 
Ukraine – annexed Crimea on purpose to protect its energy sector, its outlet in the 
Black Sea, its ports where the Russian fleet was parking, because all these were of 
vital importance for it, as well as to curb every secessionist conflict in order not to 
have hostile governments near its borders but to preserve the control in the wider area 
of the Black Sea. 
The final general assumption is that the conflict states as well as the super-
powers, for all these that happen without quarrels and dichotic rivalries should try to 
ameliorate their relations and to defer, each one by its side in some of their demands 
in order to predominate the logic because many things will depend from them for the 
wider area of the Black Sea, because in an opposite case this constant secessionist 
crisis will be maintained thus to continue these “frozen conflicts”. The time will 
show. 
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